您现在的位置是: 首页 >> 国际研讨会
国际研讨会
国际研讨会
  • 法与经济学国际研讨会论文摘要
  • 国际会议经济增长的动力:法和经济学的视角参会论文摘要

    Collections of Abstracts of Papers Presented to the International Conference onThe Forces of Economic Growth: A Law and Economics Perspective

    小组1:合同、公司治理与金融

    Panel1: Contract, Corporate Governance, Finance

    1.题目:促进创新:上市公司的法律

    No.1 TitlePromoting Innovation: The Law of Publicly Traded Corporations

    作者:梅里特·B.福克斯教授,哥伦比亚大学法学院

    AuthorProfessor Merritt B. Fox, Columbia Law School

    摘要:创新对于提高一个社会的经济福利至关重要。法律与公共政策可以在很多不同的方面促进创新,其中对知识产权的适当保护,为教育和基础研究提供资金等问题已经得到充分重视。本文关注的焦点是与上市公司相关的公司法和证券法对创新的影响。近年来,经济分析方法主导了公司和证券领域的研究,静态效率则是关注的重点。相反,动态效率,或者说如何通过创新提高福利,却没有得到足够的重视。

    这种现象并不奇怪,因为乍看起来公司法和证券法中与上市公司相关的部分似乎与创新没有很大关系。然而,进一步研究会发现它们对创新有很大影响。这些法律将影响企业在内部和外部两个层面上的决策方式,并进而决定实际投资项目的实施情况。

    做出最好的选择和促进创新是密切联系的。只有以创新为基础的投资项目才有生命力,才有可能带来超额预期回报。反过来说,具有超额回报的项目也大都是以创新为基础的。因此,本文将着力解决法律如何通过对不同主体(投资项目的支持者,既存企业及金融机构的员工,个人投资者)行为的影响使得整个系统对以创新为基础的投资项目更加敏感。

    AbstractInnovation is critical to improving a society’s economic welfare. Law and public policy more generally, can help promote innovation in a variety of ways. The appropriate level of protection for intellectual property and the funding of education and basic research are examples of ways that have received considerable attention. The focus of this paper, however, is the impact on innovation of the securities and corporate law relating to publicly traded corporations. While economic analysis has dominated U.S. corporate and securities scholarship in recent decades,static efficiency has been the primary concern. The promotion of welfare enhancing innovation—dynamic efficiency—has attracted little study.

    This dearth of research is not surprising because corporate and securities laws applicable to public corporations appear at first glance to have little to do with innovation. Further examination, though, suggests that they play a much larger role. These laws help shape the way decisions are made within firms and in the larger financial markets in which they operate that determine which proposed real investment projects are, and are not, implemented.

    Making the best choices and promoting innovation are closely related. Unless an investment project proposal is innovation based, it is unlikely to be highly promising. Non-innovation based project proposals are unlikely to have above normal expected returns. In contrast, projects with unusually high returns are very likely to be innovation based. Theses are the ones that can contribute to growth. This paper addresses the question of how law, through its influence on the behavior of a variety of actors–investment project proponents, persons working in established firms and in financial intermediaries, and individual investors–can make the overall system more sensitive to the potential of promising innovation based investment project proposals

    2.题目:金融创新与上市公司诉讼理论新谜题

    No.2 TitleFinancial Innovation and the Puzzles in Lawsuits Related to the Listed Corporations

    作者:施天涛教授,清华大学法学院

    AuthorProfessor Shi Tiantao, School of Law, Tsinghua University

    摘要:我国资本市场上出现的期货、期权以及融资融券等新的融资工具和交易方式,繁荣了市场,也影响了上市公司的资本结构和融资渠道,同时会对公司、证券诉讼问题带来一些影响。本文简单探讨其中的三个问题:1、股权型投资和债权型投资在受信义务制度中的地位问题;2、权证投资者的利益如何在证券民事赔偿诉讼中体现;3、融资融券交易对证券民事赔偿当事人的影响。

    AbstractIn China’s capital market, new financial instruments such as futures, options, and shorting and margin financing, prosper the financial markets, influence the capital structures and financing channels of the listed corporations, and bring new problems and concerns in related lawsuits. In this paper we will briefly address the following three problems: the status of bond investment versus that of the equity investment in relation to fiduciary duty; how to protect the interests of the holders of derivatives in securities litigation; the influence of shorting and margin financing transactions on the parties in securities litigation.

    3.题目:危机时代的私募股权基金:私人自治还是法律强制?

    No.3 TitlePrivate Equity Funds in the Age of Crisis: Private Ordering vs. Mandatory Law?

    作者:瑞纳·卡姆兹博士,马克斯·普朗克研究所

    AuthorDoctor Rainer Kulms,Max Planck Institute

    摘要:基金投资中的私人缔约问题已成为近期政策讨论的热点。金融危机的发生就被认为源于对私人缔约的过度依赖。进一步的考察可以发现,任何对投资基金的管制都必须面对两个问题:维持基金内部的公司治理标准和私人投资的资本市场性质。本文将关注对私募股权基金进行治理时,公司法和资本市场管制的交界之处。我们将对英国、卢森堡、瑞士、法国和德国进行比较研究,并分析英国的有限合伙制对欧洲大陆法律体系的影响。

    AbstractThe private contracting aspects of fund investment have come to mesmerise the current policy debate. It is assumed that the financial crisis has its roots in undue reliance on private order­ing. Closer inspection suggests that any regulatory policy on investment funds will have to address two problems, the maintenance of corporate governance standards within the funds and the capital market aspects of private investment. This paper explores the interface be­tween company law and capital market regulations for private equity funds. The comparative survey includes the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Switzerland, France and Germany, as­sessing the competitive impact of the English Limited Partnership on continental European jurisdictions.

    4.题目:对欧洲合同法消灭时效原则的经济分析

    No.4 TitleAn Economic Assessment of the Extinctive Prescription Rules in the Principles of European Contract Law

    作者:简资修副教授,台湾大学法学院

    AuthorProfessor Tze-Shiou Chien, College of Law, National Taiwan University

    摘要:法律具有时间维度。消灭时效原则赋予了债务人由于时间的流逝拒绝履行债权人请求的权利。在实践中,这一原则,尤其是其适用范围和时效期间的长度,在各个法律体系间存在广泛区别。为了使法律统一及系统化,欧洲合同法委员会近期在其《欧洲合同法原则》(以下简称原则)第三部分中公布了法典化的时效制度。鉴于其充分的比较法研究和简洁性,《原则》即使不能成为各个国家相关法律应用或改革的模板,也势必会成为参考。德国近期的法律改革就是一个例子。这不足为奇,因为《原则》中的时效规则本质上既完善又合理。但《原则》中提出的基本的政策考虑却不准确,有时候甚至自相矛盾。理论与法律文本之间存在缺口。本文在经济分析的基础上提出,对抗债权人和债务人在证据折旧率上的不平衡才是消灭时效原则唯一的基础。

    AbstractLaw has its time dimension. The legal doctrine of extinctive prescription would entitle the debtor to refuse the performance demanded by the creditor as a result of lapse of time. The practice of this doctrine, especially concerning its scope of application and the length of prescription period, however, is widely various among legal systems. To trim and systematize the law, the Commission on European Contract Law recently published a codified prescription regime in its Principles of European Contract Law Part III (hereinafter as the Principles). Due to its comprehensive comparative law study and simplicity, for sure, the Principles would become the reference point if not the model for application or reform in individual legal systems. Germany’s recent legal reform was just one example. This is not to be surprised because the prescription rules of the Principles basically are sound and sensible. The underlying policy considerations put forward by the Principles, however, are imprecise and sometimes conflicting. There is a gap between theory and text. This paper, based on an economic analysis, would argue that countering the imbalance of depreciation rate of evidence between the debtor and the creditor is the only foundation of the doctrine of extinctive prescription.

    5.题目:中国产权制度和资本市场的法经济学思考

    No.5 TitleThe Institutions of Property Rights and the Capital Markets in China: A Perspective from Law and Economics

    作者:刘纪鹏教授,中国政法大学法与经济学研究中心

    AuthorProfessor Liu Jipeng, RCLE, CUPL

    摘要:在中国三十年的改革过程中,国有企业改革是重点领域,其主要特点是通过股份制进行公司治理结构的改革。一些企业在进行现代企业制度改造之外,还进行了所有制改革。在这个过程中,一些企业领导层利用自己的管理权,掠夺企业资产,将企业据为己有,从而实现家族控股。中国的上市公司出现了“一股独大”的局面:上市的国有公司中,国有股占主要地位;私人上市公司往往被家族控股。因此上市公司股票流动性不足,公众持股分散,大股东缺乏制约,小股东的利益得不到保护。因此,产权改革不能仅仅追求单一的效率,一味强调将国有产权向企业家精英私人转化,而必须考虑社会公众的承受力和公众的判断标准。在公平中追求产权变革的效率,在稳定中寻求社会经济的发展。

    Abstract:As a leading role inChina’seconomic reform, the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have experienced great transition of being transformed into joint stock companies with modern corporate governance structure. In this process, however, some top managers strip the assets of the companies, tunnel firm’s value out, and even usurp the ownership of these SOEs. In current China, the ownership of shares are centralized in both state-owned listed companies where state-holding shares dominate and private listed companies where private families keep control, with a consequence of a less liquid capital market, dispersed public shareholdings, and neglected interests of minority shareholders. Therefore, the reform of the property rights system should not just seek the efficiency by transferring state owned property to the entrepreneur elites without considering the social equity, but should take the tolerance and judgment standards of the society in consideration and try to harmonize efficiency and equity and coordinate economic growth with social stability.

    小组2:行政法、管制与风险分配

    Panel 2: Administrative Law, Regulation, and Risk Distribution

    6.题目:成本-收益分析和可行性分析:两种监管方式的比较

    No.6 TitleCost-Benefit Analysis and Feasibility Analysis: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Regulation

    作者:埃里克·A.波斯纳教授,芝加哥大学法学院

    AuthorProfessor Eric A. Posner, University of Chicago Law School

    摘要:可行性分析(有些情况下被称为以技术为基础的分析)作为一种衡量政府管制效果的工具已经成为成本-收益分析的主要替代性选择。尽管监管机构用可行性分析方法的时间比用成本-收益分析方法的时间长,但是可行性分析在学术文献中受到的关注却很少。近年来,成本-收益分析的批评者提出可行性分析是替代成本-收益分析的最好方法。我们将通过揭示可行性分析的分析结构和探索其规范性基础来继续这种讨论,然后提出批评。我们的论述基于两个可行性分析的案例,其中一个由OSHA实施,另一个由EPA实施。我们发现可行性分析会同时导致过少和过多管制,而且可行性分析缺少规范性基础,因此不应该应用于政府管制。

    AbstractFeasibility analysis, a method of evaluating government regulations, has emerged as the major alternative to cost-benefit analysis. Although regulatory agencies have used feasibility analysis (in some contexts called “technology-based” analysis) longer than cost-benefit analysis, feasibility analysis has received far less attention in the scholarly literature. In recent years, however, critics of cost-benefit analysis have offered feasibility analysis as a superior alternative. We advance the debate by uncovering the analytic structure of feasibility analysis and its normative premises, and then criticizing them. Our account builds on two examples of feasibility analysis, one conducted by OSHA and the other by EPA. We find that feasibility analysis leads to both under- and over-regulation, and we conclude that it lacks a normative justification and should have no place in government regulation.

    7.题目:法律的影响评估和成本效益分析——以中国为例

    No.7 TitleThe Impact Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis of Law: The Practices in China

    作者:席涛教授,中国政法大学法与经济学研究中心

    AuthorProfessor Xi Tao, RCLE, CUPL

    摘要:法律的影响评估和成本效益分析是立法前和立法后两种主要的法律评估方法。如果立法时缺少法律对经济、社会、政府、企业、个人和环境的影响评估,缺少法律的成本效益分析,即使可以立法,由于法律本身的原则性和抽象性,实践中也会遇到如何执法和怎样守法的问题。实际上,在中国的立法中,由于缺乏必要的分析工具,已经出现了很多争论。例如《行政许可法》中关于市场机制和行政许可的争论,《反垄断法》中关于垄断的市场份额标准和经营者集中对市场竞争的影响,《破产法》中破产企业的银行担保债权和职工劳动债权哪个优先受偿的争论,以及金融法中关于分业经营和综合经营的争论。国务院在2004年首次作出明确规定,要求积极探索对政府立法进行成本效益分析。2006年开始,在有关部委和省市开展立法前和立法后的评估制度研究,并提出在总结经验的基础上,适时推出相关制度。如果法律的影响评估和成本效益分析能够成为法律制定的原则、程序和方法,这将是中国立法史上的一次重要的制度创新。

    AbstractThe impact assessment and the cost-benefit analysis are the two basic methods to evaluate law before and after legislation. Without these methods, legal rules may face enforcement problems and difficulties in observance and compliance because of their inherent abstract and general nature. The application of these methods may help to settle disputes which have lingered in China’s legislative activities in recent years, such as the balance between administrative license and market faliure inAdministrative License Law, the influence of the provisions of market share standard and concentration of business operator on competition inAntitrust Law, and the priority of different debtors inBankruptcy Law. In 2004, for the first time in China, the State Council stipulated that the method of cost-benefit analysis should be attempted in administrative rules making. In 2006, some departments of government and some province governments started to research on the impact of law before and after legislation, and on how to establish rules and institutions of the cost-benefit analysis. It will be a great institutional innovation in China to apply the impact assessment and cost-benefit analysis into law making as principles, procedures, and methods.

    8.题目:协调侵权法中的处罚

    No.8 TitleCoordinating Sanctions in Tort

    作者:凯尔·D·罗格教授,密歇根大学法学院

    AuthorProfessor Kyle D. Logue, University of Michigan Law School

    摘要:本文首先介绍了法和经济学中对侵权法的标准认识,即将侵权法看作是一种管制工具,其目标是给予受管制的当事人最优的事前激励以最小化事故成本。在此标准解释(尽管没有被普遍接受)的基础上,我们的问题是,如果需要的话,侵权法应当如何调整以便与已经存在的非侵权性质的管制体制相协调呢?也就是说,如果某种特定的行为已经成为监管部门的管制对象(无论这种管制是以命令—控制的形式还是以征收庇古税实现成本内部化的形式),而监管部门也已经着力通过监管解决所有与此行为相关的负外部性,那么侵权法还能拥有什么监管作用呢?答案是:有时候侵权法可以扮演管制角色,有时候不可以,依情况而定。例如,如果非侵权管制标准已经达到“完全最优”,也就是说,管制标准(a)同时为行为设定了效率上限和效率下限以及(b)能够被完全实施,则侵权法应当被完全取代,即不需要采取任何侵权救济。但是,如果管制标准仅仅达到“部分最优”(例如,它仅仅规定了效率最低值或效率下限或者它仅仅部分得到执行),则侵权法应继续扮演重要的管制角色。这一框架可以用来解释如何应用侵权法的原则,例如“法律上的当然过失”原则和“规章遵循”原则。同时,这一框架还有助于解释近期的联邦优占案,其中涉及了侵权和管制标准的重叠。另外,这一理论有助于我们洞察侵权法应当如何调整,以便与那些相关的社会规范协调。按照法和经济学的传统认识,这些社会规范也是管制的一种形式。

    AbstractThis Article begins with the standard law-and-economics account of tort law as a regulatory tool, that is, as a means of giving regulated parties the optimal ex ante incentives to minimize the costs of accidents. Building on this standard (albeit not universally accepted) picture of tort law, the Article asks the question how should tort law adjust, if at all, to coordinate with already existing non-tort systems of regulation. Thus, if a particular activity is already subject to extensive agency-based regulation (whether in the form of command-and-control requirements or in the form of a cost-internalizing Pigovian tax), which presumably already addresses any negative externalities associated with the activity, what regulatory role remains for tort law? The answer: sometimes there is a regulatory role that tort law can play, sometimes not, depending on the situation. For example, if the non-tort regulatory standard is already “fully optimizing,” in the sense that the regulatory standard (a) sets both an efficient floor and an efficient ceiling of conduct and (b) is fully enforced by the regulatory, then tort law should be fully displaced, in the sense that no tort remedy should be available. If, however, the regulatory standard is only “partially optimizing” (for example, it is only an efficient minimum or efficient floor or it is only partially enforced), then tort law continues to have an important regulatory role. This framework can be used to explain how such tort doctrines as negligence per se and regulatory compliance should be applied. It also helps to explain recent federal preemption cases involving overlapping tort and regulatory standards. In addition, the framework produces insights for how tort law might efficiently be adjusted to coordinate with overlapping social norms, which are also considered within the L&E tradition to be a form of regulation.

    9.题目:反思食品免检制:风险治理的视角

    No.9 TitleRethinking the Inspection Exemption of Food: A Perspective from Risk Governance

    作者:沈岿教授,北京大学法学院

    AuthorProfessor Shen Kui, Peking University Law School

    摘要:奶粉丑闻之后轰然倒塌的食品免检制,是产品免检制在食品监管领域的延伸。产品免检制的最初设计,确有扶优扶强、引导消费、减轻企业负担、减少行政成本、摆脱地方干预的善意初衷。但是,免检制在实际运行中逐渐暴露出许多问题。围绕免检制的绩效与合法性,支持和反对的声音一直难分伯仲。引入风险理论可以发现:食品免检制忽视了食品行业在风险治理次序中的优先位置,忽视了食品风险的社会建构性,忽视了食品免检的制度风险,忽视了风险治理应有的分散、复合体系。这些忽视使其在风险社会中难获合法性,而无论其绩效如何。

    AbstractThe system of inspection exemption on food, an extension of the system of inspection exemption on products, collapsed after the milk powder scandal in the 2008. In fact, the system of inspection exemption was designed with an initial intention of rewarding winners of competition, providing the consumers necessary information, lessening bureaucratic burdens on enterprises, and getting ride of local protectionism. However, the system of inspection exemption gradually revealed its flaws in practice. Therefore, there broke out fierce debates over the performance and legitimacy of the inspection exemption, but no consensus had been reached.. With the help of the risk theory, we can find the fundamental flaws of the inspection exemption: it ignores the proper priority of the risks related to food industry, disregards the social construction of food risks, and neglects the due arrangements of the decentralization and the composition in the risk governance system. Theses failures make the system of inspection exemption illegitimate in a risk society, no matter how its performance is.

    10.题目:养老基金监管

    No.10 TitleThe Regulations of Pension Funds

    作者:格雷森·克拉克,中欧社会保障合作项目

    AuthorMr. Grayson Clarke, EU Commission

    摘要:养老基金监管一直以对固定收益型养老基金运营的监督为重点,特别在以下情况发生时:预测到赤字,发生所有权的转移,以及涉及到金融机构的稳定性。相反,尽管固定缴费型计划在职业和私人养老金市场的新成员中占据较大比例,但它受到的关注要少得多。类似地,监管主要集中在基金积累阶段,而不是基金转化为年金的支付阶段。金融危机已经暴露出固定缴费型计划的严重缺陷,因此这种计划可能面临更多的监管。但是,监管延伸也有风险。政府强制性的养老金保证安排,例如英国的养老金保障基金,可能不仅会在养老金之间引发道德风险,也涉及类似最后贷款人的巨大财务支持,即使政府不是直接担保人。

    AbstractThe thrust of regulation has been to strengthen the oversight of defined benefit pension fund operations particularly in circumstances of forecast actuarial deficit and transfers of ownership and on the financial stability of financial providers. Much less attention has been focused on defined contribution schemes which now account for the vast majority of new participants in the occupational and private pension market. Similarly most regulatory focus has been on the accumulation phase and much less on the de-cumulation phase in the conversion of funds to annuities. The financial crisis has exposed serious weaknesses in the design of DC schemes which may now be subject to additional regulation. Nevertheless ‘regulatory creep’ poses its own dangers. Government mandated pension guarantee arrangements such as the UK’s Pension Protection Fund (PPF) may not only create the danger of moral hazard among pension funds but may also involve large financial support as lender of last resort even if the Government is not a direct guarantor.

    小组3:法律,转型与经济发展(1

    Panel 3 Law, Transition, and Economic Development (1)

    11题目:系统性失灵和全球经济发展的新标准

    No.11 Title“Systemic Failures”and New Standards for Global Economic Development

    作者:吉尔伯托·安托涅利教授,博洛尼亚大学法学院

    AuthorProfessor Gilberto Antonelli, Faculty of Law, University of Bologna

    12.题目:立法背后的博弈

    No.12 TitleLegislative Games in China

    作者:李曙光教授,中国政法大学法与经济学研究中心

    AuthorProfessor Li ShuguangRCLE, CUPL

    摘要:经过近30年的改革开放,原先过度集中的利益体制被打破,国有企业、外商、民营企业与公众舆论等形成了不同的利益集团。立法机构、政府部门、学者、公众舆论、社会团体、大型企业在立法过程中都代表了不同的利益集团参与到立法博弈中。立法涉及到的利益群体越多,博弈越复杂,法律的形成过程也就越漫长,甚至会夭折。因此需要平衡立法中各种博弈的力量,使各种利益得以协调。

    AbstractAfter thirty years of reform and opening up, diverse interest groups have emerged from the old system of centralized interest representation in China. The departments of the government, scholars, medias, social organizations, and the large scale enterprises, representing different interest groups, participate in the legislative activities. The more kinds of interests the legislation is related to, the more complex the legislative game is, and then the longer the time to arrive at conclusion. Sometimes, the complexity of the interests even results in the abortion of the legislation. Therefore, we should balance and harmonize the powers of different interests in the legislative game.

    13.题目:计划与经济增长

    No.13 TitlePlanning and Economic Growth

    作者:丹尼尔·森扎里,博洛尼亚大学法学院

    AuthorProfessor Daniele Senzani,Faculty of Law, University of Bologna

    14.题目:法律与经济增长——广东经验

    No. 14 TitleLaw and Economic Growth in China: The Experience from Guangdong Province

    作者:周林彬教授,中山大学法学院

    AuthorProfessor Zhou LinbinSchool of Law, Sun Yat-sen University

    摘要:本文立足于广东改革开放与立法实践的实际,以法律经济学理论作为分析工具,旨在探讨法律与中国经济增长之间关系的一些特殊规律,亦即法律与经济增长之间关系的中国经验中的“广东经验”,从法律与经济相结合视角丰富改革开放经验总结的同时,为进一步解答法律与经济增长领域的“中国之谜”、实现广东作为实践科学发展观的排头兵提供参考。

    AbstractBased on the practices of economic reform and legislative activity in Guangdong Province, China, this paper tries to examine the special case of the relationship between law and economic growth in China, and contribute to understand China’s economic miracle from the law and economics perspective.

    15.题目:从拍卖理论看中国政府采购制度

    No.15 TitleAuction Theoretical Contributions to China’s Public Procurement Regime

    作者:斯特凡· E.魏沙尔博士,马斯特里赫特大学

    AuthorDr. Stefan E. WeishaarMaastricht University

    摘要:串通投标长期以来被认为极大地增加了公共财政支出。本文比较了产业经济理论和拍卖理论中与串通投标相关的观点,并发现在采购法的特定领域,拍卖理论扮演了重要的角色。本文接下来探讨了中国公共采购立法与以上这些法律与经济学观点在卡特尔形成与卡特尔稳定方面的比较。我们发现中国法律制度的确为串通投标卡特尔的形成和稳定提供了便利。

    AbstractBid rigging conspiracies have for long been recognized as significantly inflating public expenditures. This paper compares industrial economic and auction theoretic insights regarding bid rigging conspiracies and finds that, given the specific scope of the procurement laws, there is a strong role for auction theoretic insights to bid rigging in Public procurement laws. It subsequently examines how the Chinese Public procurement legislation compares to these law and economic insights in the areas of cartel formation and cartel stability. It is found that the Chinese legal regime does facilitate both the formation and stabilization of bid rigging cartels.

    16.题目:中国反垄断法实施与竞争政策构造

    No.16TitleThe Enforcement of Chinese Antitrust Law and the Structure of Chinese Competition Policy

    作者:黄勇教授,对外经济贸易大学法学院

    AuthorProfessor Huang Yong, Law School, University of International Business and Economics,

    摘要:改革开放以来,中国的经济结构经历了从计划经济到市场经济的转变。反垄断法作为“市场经济的宪法”,为市场经济建立了一个法律框架。中国的反垄断法是一个比较粗浅的法律体系,这部法律是中国现阶段竞争政策的主要表现形式。通过对现阶段竞争政策的理解,可以更好地分析和理解中国的反垄断法及其时代任务。第一,确立和完善市场经济。第二,控制过度的政府权力。第三,保护国家安全。

    AbstractSince the reform and opening up in 1978, China has successfully transformed itself from a planned economy to a market economy. The antitrust law, the constitution of market economy, constructs a legal foundation for the newly established market economy in China. China’s antitrust law, although elementary and sketchy, reflects the national competition policy in the current development stage. A deep understanding of current competition policy will help us to appreciate the objectives of China’s antitrust law, namely to lay the foundation for market economy, to control the excessive power of the government, and to safeguard the national security,

    小组4:法律,转型与经济发展(2

    Panel 4 Law, Transition, and Economic Development (2)

    17.题目:中国土地拍卖市场:腐败的证据?

    No.17TitleChina’s Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption?

    作者:蔡洪滨教授,北京大学光华管理学院

    AuthorProfessor Cai Hongbin, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University

    摘要:本文研究了2003—2007年的中国城市土地市场。在中国,所有的城市土地属于国有。城市政府可以通过批租出售土地使用权,相应的收入成为城市政府的主要财政来源。租赁权的出售被看作是腐败的主要场所,由此引发了近年来的一系列改革。如今,改革要求所有的租赁权以公开拍卖的形式出售。主要的拍卖类型有两种:常规的英式拍卖和我们称之为“两阶段拍卖”的非常规拍卖。后者看起来更容易遭遇腐败和潜在投标者与拍卖者之间的单边交易。理论认为,如果没有腐败,两阶段拍卖最有可能最大化某些资产的销售收入,这些资产可能拥有相对来说很少的竞标者或者可能“冷场”,这会使得难以觉察到的资产负向选择进入拍卖。但是,如果两阶段拍段更易遭遇腐败,当城市官员将更热门的资产转换为更腐败的拍卖形式时,这种拍卖则包含正向选择。本文发现,总体来说,两阶段拍卖下的出售价格要更低,而且大量证据证明了正向选择的存在。价格的区别主要可以用以下事实来解释,那就是即使在中国如火如荼的城市土地市场中,两阶段拍卖通常只有一个投标者,或者根本没有竞争。

    AbstractThis paper studies the urban land market in China in 2003—2007. In China, all urban land is owned by the state. Leasehold use rights for land for (re)development are sold by city governments and are a key source of city revenue. Leasehold sales are viewed as a major venue for corruption, prompting a number of reforms over the years. Reforms now require all leasehold rights be sold at public auction. There are two main types of auction: regular English auction and an unusual type which we call a “two stage auction”. The latter type of auction seems more subject to corruption, and to side deals between potential bidders and the auctioneer. Absent corruption, theory suggests that two stage auctions would most likely maximize sales revenue for properties which are likely to have relatively few bidders, or are “cold”, which would suggest negative selection on property unobservables into such auctions. However, if such auctions are more corruptible, that could involve positive selection as city officials divert hotter properties to a more corruptible auction form. The paper finds that, overall, sales prices are lower for two stage auctions, and there is strong evidence of positive selection. The price difference is explained primarily by the fact that two stage auctions typically have just one bidder, or no competition despite the vibrant land market in Chinese cities.

    18.题目:中国作为一个监管型国家

    No.18 TitleChinaas a Regulatory State

    作者:杜巨澜副教授,香港中文大学

    AuthorProfessor Du Julan, Department of Economics, Chinese University of Hong Kong

    摘要:市场经济模式各有不同,区别在于经济中政府权力相对于市场的强度,并可作如下排列:从私人秩序到通过法庭的私人诉讼,再到管制型国家(格雷泽,施莱弗, 2002,,2003:詹科夫等,2003)。本文通过使用对中国3073家私人企业的调查资料,构建了量化政府权力相对于市场强度的指数。这一指数在中国各个地区都不相同。我们发现,政府权力更强大地区的企业绩效更好,这表明管制型国家模型也适用于中国经济。

    AbstractMarket economy models differ in the degree of the power of government vis-a- vis market in the economy, ranging from private orderings, to private litigations through courts, and regulatory state (Glaesernd Shleifer, 2002, 2003; Djankov et al., 2003). This paper, by using data from a survey of 3,073 private enterprises in China, constructs an index to quantify the power of government vis-a- vis market, which varies across China‘s regions. It is found that enterprises located in regions with greater powers of government vis-a- vis market enjoy better performance, suggesting that regulatory state is an appropriate model of a market economy for China.

    19.题目:产权的选择性保护与中国的经济增长

    No. 19 TitleThe Selective Protection of Property Rights and the Economic Growth in China

    作者:魏建教授,山东大学经济研究院

    AuthorProfessor Wei Jian, School of Economics, University of Shandong,

    摘要:所谓的“中国之谜”认为在较低的产权保护水平下,中国却取得了30年的长期经济增长,这与良好的产权保护是经济增长必须前提的新制度经济学基本论断并不一致。但实际上“中国之谜”是一个伪命题,中国30年来采取了一种独特的产权保护方式——选择性保护,来配合经济增长的需要。以经济增长为核心目标选择性地对那些符合中国特定阶段经济增长需要的产权进行了强力保护,实现了经济增长的目标,形成了与中国特定的经济增长方式相匹配产权保护格局。因此要转变中国的经济增长方式,可以从改变产权非对称保护入手,通过全面提高产权保护水平来促进经济发展方式的转变。

    AbstractAccording to the so-called “China Mystery”, Chinese economy experiences long term growth in the recent 30 years while the protection of property rights is relative weak, a puzzle that contradicts the new institutional economics’ basic proposition that good protection of property rights is the foundation of economic growth. However, “China Mystery” is in fact a pseudo-proposition, because China adopts a unique method to protect the property rights to meet the demand of economic growth in the recent 30 years, by which we mean the selective protection of property rights. Centering on economic growth, China provides special protection to the kinds of property rights that are conducive to economic growth in the particular development stages. Therefore, to transform China’s economic growth mode, we should change the asymmetric protection of different property rights, and protect all kinds of property rights equally.

    20.题目:明晰与保护农村土地产权的原则

    No.20 TitleHow to Clarify and Protect the Land Property Rights in Rural China: the Basic Principles

    作者:柯华庆副教授,中国政法大学法学院

    AuthorProfessor Ke Huaqing, School of Law, CUPL

    摘要:不明确或无保护的产权使强者受益,当下的中国农村土地产权就是这样的处境。法律经济学应该遵循一种基于目标的探效推理(abduction)模式,不管是清晰产权还是保护产权都应该围绕土地产权改革的目标和现实约束来进行选择,而且以实际效果为最终检验标准。首先,有三种明晰农村土地产权的基本模式:完善农村土地集体所有制、私有化和国有化。到底应该采取哪种产权模式依赖于我们改革的目标。如果我们的目标是共同富裕和经济持续稳定向前发展的话,那么如何完善土地农村集体所有制就是最优的选择:清晰产权主体,清晰界定产权束中的各种权利,完善土地承包经营权的物权性,尊重和制度化不同地区农民在土地集体所有制基础上的创新。城镇化过程中的土地流转和土地征用问题是对农村土地产权的保护提出了挑战,我们应该对于不同的农村土地流转和征用采取财产规则、责任规则或者限制交易规则进行保护,以达到经济长远发展的目标。

    AbstractWhat we have seen in rural China is that economically or politically advantaged groups are favored because the property rights are ambiguous or poorly protected. Following a so called abduction mode, we believe that the reform of land property rights in rural China should center on appropriate goals and take the constraints of reform into consideration, and should be tested by actual results. There are three basic methods to clarify the land property rights in rural China, namely improving the current collective ownership, privatizing rural land completely, or nationalization. Which one should be chosen depends on the goal of the reform. Given the objective of common prosperity and stable economic growth, the optimal method should be improving the current collective ownership by identifying the real owners, clarifying the bundle of property rights, strengthening the usufructuary rights of peasants to rural land, and absorbing some innovations in practice into institutional design. In the process of China’s urbanization, problems related to land transactions and land takings challenge the protection of property rights, which calls for more protection on rural land by making use of the mixture of property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules.

    小组5:法律、转型与经济发展(3

    Panel 5 Law, Transition, and Economic Development (3)

    21.题目:法律变迁与经济绩效:一个评价

    No 21 TitleLegal Change and Economic Performance: An Assessment

    作者:杰马里·阿加尼教授,都灵大学法学院

    AuthorProfessor Gianmaria Ajani, University of Torino, Faculty of Law

    摘要:按照西方的法律传统,规则是通过两种不同的程序制定的:重述(判例法)和议会立法。因此,有权改变法律的是法官和立法者。如果不考虑关于法律变迁的标准说法,而是转向一种最终会导致法律改革的程序性分析,我们就能获得一种不同的视角。在法律体系的相关领域中,我们习惯的关于法律变迁的标准说法看来已经已经被一种新的模式超越,这种模式将立法的合法性置于一种与特定规章集合的必要性相关的技术性评估之上。我们将这种模式称为功能主义。

    AbstractWithin the Western legal tradition, norms are set through two different procedures: reiteration (case law) and parliamentary law-making.Accordingly, those empowered to change the law are the judges and the legislators.A different perspective can be taken leaving aside the standard illustration of legal change and moving towards an analysis of theprocesswhich leads to the final result of the legal reform.Within a relevant sector of a legal system the standard illustration of legal change we were used to seems to be overcome by a new mode, which grounds legitimacy for law-making rather in a technical appraisal of the necessity of a peculiar set of regulations. We can call this mode “functionalism”.

    22.题目:社会保险法的经济分析

    No. 22 Title: The Economic Analysis of Social Insurance Law

    作者:胡继晔副教授,中国政法大学法与经济学研究中心

    Author: Professor Hu Jiye, RCLE, CUPL

    摘要:作为总体经济改革的一个重要部分,过去12年来中国成功地启动了以社会统筹和个人账户相结合为核心内容的社会保障制度改革。本文按照法律经济学的分析方法,对经过人大两次审议的《社会保险法》草案三个核心内容进行经济分析:一是根据诺贝尔经济学奖获得者萨缪尔逊和莫迪利安尼的两个养老经济分析模型,分析认为在中国国情条件下从现收现付到个人账户基金体制的转轨过程可以实现帕累托改进,《社会保险法》可以把原先的国务院1997年第26号文件确立为法律制度。二是应用保险经济学中的大数法则理论分析认为:统筹是实现收入再分配和分散风险这两个社会保障重要功能的关键。为了充分发挥中国幅员辽阔和多样性的优势,实现养老保险全国范围内的统筹十分重要。为实现这一目标,必须以立法的形式来由中央政府制定统一的养老金缴费和待遇的规则。三是应用经济学中关于市场失灵的相关理论,借鉴其他国家对社保基金实行严格监管的法律,探讨在我国建立社会保险基金监督管理法律法规体系,实行全国统一的养老金管理系统。

    Abstract:As part of its far-reaching reform, China hascommenced the reform of social security institutions by combiningasocial poolwithindividual accountsin the mandatory pension system. Based on the law and economic approach, this paper focuses on three key fields of the draft of social insurance law which had been deliberated twicebytheNational People’s Congress.First,theories presented by someNobel laureates in economics-Samuelson’s exact consumption loan model and Modigliani’s life cycle hypothesis- will be usedtoanalyze the Pareto improvementin thetransitionfromthe system ofpay-as-you-go to thecombination of asocial poolwithindividual accounts in China. Theenactment ofsocial insurance law willcodifythe pension framework whichwas establishedin 1997 by the State Council.Second, the law of large numbers theory in insurance economicswill be employed to argue thatpooling lies at the core of the redistributive and risk-sharing elements of pensions. Given the size and diversity of China, national pooling of the mandatory pension schemes is particularly important.There should be a single set of regulations on mandatory pensions, preferably in the form of legislation that is enforceable. The rules on contributions and benefits should be set centrally by formula.Finally,drawinglessons fromthe legal rules ofother countries on the social security funds,the economic theory of market failurewill be usedtoexplore how toestablisha singleuniform legal framework within which social surety funds will be supervised and regulated efficiently.

    23题目:中国城市房屋拆迁的法经济分析

    No.23 TitleLawand Economics Analysis of Urban Housing Demolition and Relocation in China

    作者:冯玉军教授,中国人民大学法学院

    Author: Professor Feng Yujun, School of Law, Renmin,Universityof China

    摘要:最近几年,中国的房屋拆迁引起了很多争议。争议频繁涉及不同的政府主体、私人开发商、法院、建筑公司和一般民众。私人权益和公共利益之间,个人之间,商业利益和政治力量之间的冲突正变得日益激烈,并引起了有关社会稳定性的担忧。那些关系网发达的建筑开发商都在努力获得非法利润。一些强制驱逐的案例已经侵犯了基本人权,但是受害人并没有法律的途径来维权。通过对中国现今的法律框架和处理拆迁问题的有关政策变化的研究,作者运用法律经济学和两种博弈理论模型直接阐述实践中的情形和《物权法》《中华人民共和国城市房地产管理法》《城市规划法》,尤其是《城市房屋拆迁管理条例》,以及其他的法律和规章。最后,作者明确了以法律方式解决拆迁问题的困境,并提出了一些解决途径和建议。

    关键词:中国城市拆迁法和经济分析解决办法和方案

    AbstractIn recent years, the problem ofchaiqian(“Demolition and Eviction/Relocation”) , has become a very controversial issue in Urban China.The disputes frequently involve various governmental bodies, private developers, the courts, construction companies, and the general public. Conflicts between private rights and public interest, between individual interests, commercial interests and the political power, are becoming increasingly fierce and have raised concerns about social stability. Those well-connected developers try to gain huge illegal profits. Some forced eviction cases have violated basic human rights, but the evictees still lack legal redress. Through an examination of the current legal framework in China and the policy changes that have been tried to deal with the issues associated with demolition and relocation, the author uses the method of law and economics and two kinds of game theory model to directly illustrate situations encountered in practice and theProperty lawLaw of the People’s Republic of China on Administration of the Urban Real Estatethe City Planning Law of the People’s Republic of ChinaespeciallyRegulation on the Administration of Urban House Demolishment and Relocationand other national laws and regulations. Finally, the author describes the current difficulties in legal solution forrelocationdisputes, and proposes some possible solutions and recommendations.

    24.题目:经济增长的决定因素:从哈罗德多马到LLSV

    No.24 TitleDeterminants of Economic Growth: From Harrod-Domar to LLSV

    作者:徐光东副教授,中国政法大学法与经济学研究中心

    AuthorProfessor Guangdong Xu, RCLE, CUPL

    摘要:本文对有关经济增长的理论进行了综述,并特别关注法律在经济增长中的作用。在过去的几十年里,大量的研究者致力于探索经济增长的决定因素,并提供了各种可能的答案。到目前为止,“制度起作用”的观点得到了来自历史经验和比较分析的有力支持,并因此成为学者的共识。与其他制度相比,法律在现代经济中的作用尤为重要。从上个世纪60年代开始,以法和经济学为代表的学术流派开始关注法律对经济活动的影响。但是在90年代以前,法和经济学的研究主要集中于微观层面,并没有在宏观层面上将法律和不同国家的经济表现联系起来。90年代中后期,随着LLSV的一系列文章的发表,局面发生了重大的变化。LLSV的论文引发了大量的后续研究,其中有些研究支持他们关于普通法优于民法的结论,另外的许多研究则从不同的方面对他们的结论进行了批评。简而言之,LLSV的贡献与其说是令人信服地证明了普通法的优越性,不如说是呼吁对法律在经济增长中的作用进行更加深入的探索。

    AbstractThis paper briefly reviews the theory of economic growth, with special attention to the role of legal institutions. Over the past several decades, a great number of scholars have devoted themselves to exploring the determinants of growth and provided alternative theories on potential sources of cross-country income differences. As far as it goes, the proposition that institutions matter seems to receive most support from the evidence across both time and space, and thereby has become a consensus among scholars. Compared with other institutions, legal institutions exert a more important influence on economic performance in modern economy. The interaction between law and economic outcomes has been extensively studied since 1960s, within the discipline of law and economics. Before 1990s, scholars of law and economics were concerned mostly about how legal rules influence individuals’ incentives on micro-level, instead of relating different level of economic growth to the differences of legal rules on macro-level. This situation has been dramatically changed since the end of 1990s under the stimulation of a series of cross-country econometric researches conducted by four economists, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV). LLSV’s seminal articles have resulted in an explosion of studies on the subject of the relationship between legal institutions and economic growth, some of which confirm their conclusion on the superiority of common law over civil law, while others question LLSV’s theory on various grounds. In brief, the primary contribution of LLSV is rather an appeal to inquire more deeply into the role of legal rules in economic growth than a convincingly advocacy of the excellence of common law.

    题目:经济和政府的领土

    TitleEconomy and Government of the Territory

    作者:安东尼奥·卡鲁洛教授,博洛尼亚大学法学院

    AuthorProfessor Antonio Carullo,Faculty of Law, University of Bologna

    摘要:论文主要集中于四个方面。首先,必须认识到经济发展的“领土维度”。从这个角度来看,规划的公共政策、经济体系与金融体系之间的关系、基础设施的建设和生产性活动的选址都不是孤立的。如我们所知,制度、经济和领土之间的联系,既能够增强一个经济体的竞争力,也可能引发它的下滑。从法和经济学角度看,法学家的责任在于精确了解追求这些目标过程中的不同学科之间联系的动态机制。其次,公共政策的实施:在地方政府经济中的城市规划工具及其与经济、生产力、社会和就业发展之间的关系。第三,对于欧盟层面的法律和全国性法律之间的关系进行探讨,竞争或者聚合的原则应当比特别的国家规则占优。最后,讨论经济和政府领土之间的平衡关系。

    AbstractFirst,it has to recognize that there is a "territorial dimension" of development and from it the public policies of programming, the relationships between economic system and financial system, and the realization of infrastructures or the location of productive activities, cannot be separated. As we can see, the connection between institutions, economy and territory plays an important role to strengthen the competitiveness or the decline of an economy. The duty of the jurist, in a law and economics perspective, is precisely in understanding the dynamics of the different disciplines related one to another in the pursuit of objectives.

    In the following text, we will discuss : (2)the implementation of public policies: the urban planning instruments in local government of economy and the relationship with the economic, productive, social and employment development. (3)The relationship between Community law and National law: the principle of competition/concourse prevails over the special national discipline. (4)The point of arrival: the balance between economy and government of the territory.